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Abstract Our lives are commonly involved with fictionality, an activity that adults
share with children. After providing a brief reconstruction of the most important
cognitive theories on pretence, we will argue that pretence has to do with meta-
representations, albeit in a rather weakened sense. In our view, pretending entails
being aware that a certain representation does not fit in the very same representa-
tional model as another representation. This is a minimal metarepresentationalism,
for normally metarepresentationalism on pretense claims that pretending is or
entails representing a representation qua representation, i.e. as conceptualised as a
representation, in its very content. In the final section we will try to draw some
consequences of our view as to the debate in cognitive science on mindreading.
Given this minimal metarepresentationalism, the two main positions on mind-
reading, the ‘theory theory’ and the ‘simulation theory’, turn out to be closer than
one would have originally supposed.
Keywords Pretence  Metarepresentation  Simulation  Simulation theory 
Theory theory
1 Introduction
Our lives are commonly involved with fictionality. We are engaging in fiction
whenever we make believe that something is the case. Its complexity
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notwithstanding, adult make-believe shares its core features with infantile pretence,
as Walton (1990) has authoritatively shown. At least since Piaget (1962) and
Vygotsky (1967), many psychological researches have in fact pointed out that
pretence emerges early in childhood, roughly between 18 and 24 months of age.
Moreover, from the onset infantile pretence is a quite articulated activity displaying
the kind of complexity that adult make-believe possesses. Children play at being
someone else (Ann pretends to be a princess) or at having different features (Ann,
who is a blond girl, pretends to have brown hair). They also pretend that objects are
either different things (a banana is taken to be a telephone) or have different features
from those they actually have (a doll’s face is taken to be dirty when it is not); but
they also pretend that there are objects or individuals that in actual fact do not exist
(Ann pretends there is a train in the room).
In what follows, we will first provide a brief rational reconstruction of the most
important cognitive theories on pretence, in order to show subsequently that
pretence has to do with metarepresentation, albeit in a rather weakened, or minimal,
sense. First of all, following Perner (1991) we use an interpreted notion of
representation; that is, a representation is individuated also in terms of its content.
This means that there is a close similarilty between our notion of a representation
and the notion of a thought, as is traditionally mobilised in philosophy of mind. In
this respect, a singular representation is, exactly like a singular thought in the
philosophical tradition stemming out of McDowell (1982), a representation such
that the items constituting the ‘subject’ part of its content are objectual rather than
conceptual: a thought as well as a representation to the effect that o is F literally
contains the object o, rather than a concept allegedly singling out it, in its content.
Given that a metarepresentation is a representation of a representation, a singular
metarepresentation is a second-order representation whose content is inter alia
constituted by the first-order representation it is about rather than by the concept of
that representation: it is a representation to the effect that another representation is
F, whose content is precisely constituted (inter alia) by this other representation
(rather than by a concept singling out it). This theoretical machinery enables us to
claim that pretending entails singular metarepresentations, that is, second-order
representations whose contents have a first-order representation among their
constituents, namely, the representation the relevant second-order representation is
about. In a nutshell, pretending entails being aware that a certain representation
does not fit in the very same representational model as another representation. This
is a minimal metarepresentationalism, for normally (as we will see from our
reconstruction) metarepresentationalism on pretense claims that pretending is or
entails representing a representation qua representation, that is, as conceptualised as
a representation in its very content, which is therefore general and not singular.
Finally, from this minimal metarepresentationalism on pretence we will try to draw
some consequences as to the debate in cognitive science on mindreading. As we will
see, given this minimal metarepresentationalism, the two main positions on
mindreading, the ‘theory theory’ and the ‘simulation theory’, are closer than one
would have originally supposed.
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2 From decoupling to multiple models
In pretence, a world different from the real one arises through imagination: the child
becomes a dog, a banana becomes a telephone, and so on. In principle, it could be
the case that the pretending child really believes (s)he is a dog. If this were so, (s)he
would pretend by building a single first-order representation of a (fictional) world in
which (s)he is a dog. According to Leslie (1987), however, this theoretical
possibility misleadingly conflates make-believe and error. The pretending child is
not making a mistake: (s)he knows that (s)he is not a dog, for example because (s)he
does not eat dog food or bones. Or again, when playing with mud (s)he pretends to
make a cake, (s)he actually refrains from eating it. Thus, it seems that not just one,
but two representations of the world are involved. One presents the fictional
situation (in which the child is a dog or the cake is made of chocolate); the second
presents the actual situation, in which dog-food is dog-food and the cake is made of
mud.
But having to handle two representations at the same time engenders the problem
of representational abuse. Take Leslie’s favourite example: a child playing with his
mother pretends that a banana is a telephone. In the framework we have outlined,
the child has to handle two representations. The symbolic item ‘‘banana’’ is now
referentially linked to an unusual class of objects, telephones. In the meanwhile, the
same symbolic item ‘‘banana’’ is as usual linked to bananas. If we took these
representations at their face value, the word ‘‘banana’’ would get two meanings, thus
engendering a representational abuse (Leslie 1987:415). Moreover, the problem
would multiply as the child grows up and starts making-as-if, for example, a banana
is a sword, a gun or a magic wand. The lexicon would become more and more
instable and inaccurate with age.
Leslie’s solution (ibid.) is to suppose that the fictional meaning is somehow
‘‘decoupled’’: there has to be a way to mentally tag the non-literal reference. Leslie
postulates the existence of a cognitive mechanism, the decoupler, which develops
around 18 months. The decoupler takes a primary representation as input and
quarantines it, preventing the cognitive system from committing an informational
abuse. For example, if the child mobilises the primary representation to the effect
that this is a banana, the decoupler quarantines it by putting it into quotes: (Mummy
pretends that) ‘‘this is a banana’’. So, in point of fact, the activity of the decoupler
amounts to mobilising two different representational models, one of which
represents the literal reference and the other the non-literal reference.
The need to exploit representations belonging to different models, one of which
is quarantined, is appreciated by other authors interested in pretence—cf. (Perner
1991; Jarrolds et al. 1994; Nichols and Stich 2003). Perner (1991) in fact agrees that
there has to be a way of distinguishing pretend-play from error as well as of
avoiding representational abuse. In order to account for this, he maintains that one
has to see the child as being able to build multiple representational models, a reality
model and a model for imaginary situations (the pretend model), and to decouple the
fictional representation by putting it in the pretend model. Likewise, for Nichols and
Stich what the decoupler does is to allow the child’s computational process to run in
a different epistemic space, a different model. Provided that it is insulated from the
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model of reality, no other more complex process is involved. Since the two models
are epistemically separated, their being internally coherent is according to these
authors sufficient for the problem of representational abuse to be ruled out.
For Perner (1991), the capacity to mobilise multiple models is one of the most
important developmental steps, allowing children to represent noncurrent situations,
such as past, desired or fictional situations. Multiple models also enable one to
understand media such as pictures, drawings and maps. According to Deloache and
Burns (1994:106), the understanding of the twofold nature of public representations
(which are both objects and representations of objects) precisely requires that
distinct mental representations are entertained; that is, a representation of the picture
qua material object among others (that merely has the capacity of representing
another object), as well as a representation of this latter object. Thus, not only that
understanding will scaffold the later children’s ability to further understand the
representational nature of private representations (i.e. mental representations), but it
also prompts the mobilisation of distinct representational models which allegedly
grounds pretend-play. For the role of public symbolic systems in understanding the
notion of representation see also Deloache (2004).
Some authors refer to the ‘multiple models’ approach as the ‘behaving-as-if’
theories. Rakoczy et al. (2004) quote Nichols and Stich (2003:37): conceptually
speaking, pretence is ‘‘acting-as-if in a way that would be appropriate if p (the
counterfactual situation) were the case.’’ Let us look at the so-called ‘behaving-as-
if’ theories of pretence in more detail. In the view of authors such as Harris (1994),
Lillard (1994), Nichols and Stich (2003), in early pretence children behave-as-if the
fictional, counterfactual situation were the case. As Lillard et al. (2000) show, they
overattribute the ability to pretend to inanimate, mindless entities and do not
conceptualise what they do as an intentional, voluntary activity. In Lillard’s (1993)
experiment, children aged 4 and 5 years are told that Moe, a troll from the Land of
Trolls, (a) hops around like a rabbit and (b) does not known what a rabbit is. When
asked about Moe’s attitude, they tend to say that Moe is pretending to be a rabbit,
not taking into consideration its ignorance of rabbits. They seem to base their
judgments merely on the action being performed by Moe (who is engaged in the
same kind of action one would be engaged in when pretending). Other 4-year-old
children tested by Lillard (1998) perform no better. They are told that the doll Chris
(a) is digging and (b) does not want (or does not try) to be like a dog. Children tend
to say that Chris is pretending to be a dog.
Other authors evidenced a more subtle understanding of pretence, still within an
unintentional perspective. In their important study, Harris et al. (1994) looked for
children’s ability to integrate successive pretend actions into a coherent causal-
inferential sequence. In one experiment, children ranging from 28 to 38 months saw
a puppet pretending to pour milk from an empty milk container into a matchbox.
Then the puppet tipped the content of the matchbox over a toy horse. The children
accurately identified which substance had been poured on the toy animal.
Given this quasi-behaviouristic flavour of the ‘behaving-as-if’- theories, it is not
clear whether ‘behaving-as-if’- theories is just another label for what we have called
here the ‘multiple model’- approach. At any rate, a merit of the ‘multiple models’-
approach is that the claim according to which, from the cognitive point of view, to
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pretend means to activate a representational model where representations of a
fictional world are stored—a model which is different from the model where
representations of the real world are stored—gives rise1 to a thesis recently
developed in philosophy of language to deal with fictionality in general, not only
infantile pretence.
In this thesis—see for example, Recanati (2000), Voltolini (2006)—the
fictionality of a text (mutatis mutandis, the fictionality of an icon or of a mental
representation) lies in the fact that the sentences that text contains are interpreted in
a fictional context, namely a context whose world parameter is constituted by a
fictional world, the world in which the story is set.2 In other words, once any of
those sentences is paired with one such fictional context, that sentence is given
fictional truth-conditions. If things in the fictional world in question stand as the
sentence fictionally says they stand (by having such fictional truth-conditions), the
sentence will moreover be fictionally true, true with respect to the world of the
relevant story. Yet the text no longer counts as fictional once its very same sentences
are interpreted in a real context, namely a context whose world parameter is
constituted by the real world. In other words, once any of those sentences is paired
with a real context, the sentence in question may well be given real truth-conditions.
If things in the real world in question stand as the sentence says they stand (by
having such real truth-conditions), the sentence will moreover be really true, true at
the real world. In some cases, the fictional and the real truth-conditions of a
sentence, as well as the fictional and the real truth-values of a sentence, coincide; in
other cases, at least those truth-values differ; and in still other cases, also those
truth-conditions differ.
Take the sentence ‘‘Napoleon is arrogant’’, which interpreted in the fictional
context whose world parameter is the world of Tolstoj’s War and Peace is
fictionally true iff in that world our flesh-and-blood Napoleon is arrogant; since this
is the case, that sentence is fictionally true. Yet when interpreted in a real context,
that sentence is again true, this time really true, iff in the real world our flesh-and-
blood Napoleon is arrogant; since this is the case, that sentence is also really true.
Now, take the sentence ‘‘Charlemagne is imbecile’’: even though it has the same
truth-conditions both when interpreted in the fictional context whose world
parameter is the world of Luigi Pulci’s Morgante maggiore and when interpreted in
a real context, it is true at the world of the former context yet false at the real world.
Finally, take the sentence ‘‘Uriah Heep is arrogant’’. When interpreted in the
fictional context whose world parameter is the world of Dickens’ David
1 We limit ourselves to saying that Perner’s distinction between different representational models gives
rise to the philosophical treatment of fictionality in question for, according to Recanati (2000), linguistic
representations of a fictional reality undergo a contextual meaning shift—expressions within those
representations are given meaning in a fictional, rather than in a real, context—whereas for Perner no such
shift occurs (1991:55). In his view, the pretend model arises from the fact that a certain representation
originally belonging to the real model yet which turns out to be false when evaluated with respect to the
real world, is simply displaced into a new model in which it is true with respect to the fictional world of
that model (1991:27–28, 30–31).
2 In point of fact, it is controversial whether the world in which the story is set really shrinks to just one
world or whether there are many worlds which can be taken as such worlds. For the discussion on this
point, see Lewis (1978). It is, however, irrelevant for our purposes.
How pretence can really be metarepresentational 35
123
Copperfield, that sentence is fictionally true iff in that world the individual there
named ‘‘Uriah Heep’’ is arrogant. Yet when interpreted in a real context, since in
such a context the name ‘‘Uriah Heep’’ does not primarily refer to anybody, the
sentence primarily has no real truth-conditions.3
All in all, therefore, the ‘multiple models’- approach to pretence can account both
for the fact that we take sentences involving fiction to be false, or truth-valueless
(when they are taken as representations evaluated with respect to the real world),
and for the fact that we take them to be true (when they are taken as representations
evaluated with respect to the world in which the story is set). That is, even adult
forms of pretence such those mobilised by story-telling practices involving fictional
sentences can be appealed to by a ‘multiple models’- approach, which limits itself to
appealing to simple representations even though displayed precisely in distinct
representational models.
3 Strong and weak metarepresentational accounts of pretence
Rakoczy et al. (2004) criticise the ‘behaving-as-if’ approaches. First of all, they
point out the difficulty of Lillard’s experiments, which require complex linguistic
ability and are based on children’s explicit answers. As a consequence, less-
demanding non-verbal tasks could reveal a more subtle understanding of pretence
even in younger subjects. In particular, they could reveal children’s ability to
distinguish between different as-if actions, such as pretending, trying and/or
mistakenly doing X.
Rakoczy and Tomasello (2006) examined children of 22 and 27 months of age.
During the warming-up session some objects were introduced in the experimental
setting, in order to give the child the possibility to perform both creative pretence
and trying during the later test phase, so as to avoid the risk of mere behavioural
imitation of the experimenter’s actions. The object introduced were a teddy bear, a
bowl with a fork, and a wrench, which the experimenter explicitly invited the child
to use while playing. Then, half the children were presented with a pretend
behaviour, while the other half were presented with a trying behaviour. The
experimenter said ‘‘I am going to…[action] now’’, then started the pretend (trying)
action. When pretending, the experimenter gave non-verbal signs of playfulness,
such as smiles and exclamations (‘‘ooh’’, ‘‘shh’’ when pouring water, etc.). On the
other hand, trying actions were accompanied by non-verbal signs of effort and
disappointment (‘‘Hm?’’).
In the crucial part of the task, children’s reactions to the demonstrations were
observed. The authors coded as ‘‘inferential pretence/inferential trying’’ the
children’s enriched actions that went beyond the experimenter’s behaviour, while
3 As our examples should make clear, we are speaking of simple sentences occurring in texts, not of
complex metarepresentational sentences of the form ‘‘According to David Copperfield, Uriah Heep is
arrogant’’ or ‘‘Mummy pretends that the banana is a telephone’’. Normally, these latter sentences are used
outside fiction in order to speak of the fiction itself, so they are not typically ascribed fictional truth-
conditions. (Of course, there may be cases of second-order fictions in which a story is told which is about
an(other) story, but for simplicity’s sake we rule out these cases here.).
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they coded as ‘‘simple pretence/simple trying’’ actions lacking such a creative
component. Simple pretence/trying actions were not taken into account in order to
avoid the possibility of a superficial imitative behaviour, lacking any intentional
understanding.4 Like the 3-year-old children observed by Rakoczy et al. (2004), the
27-month-olds also tended to imitate the pretend action by themselves pretending in
an ‘‘enriched way’’, for example, by using non-serious speech and going beyond
what the experimenter did (that is, enriching the scenario). Correspondingly, after
engaging in trying behaviours the 27-month-old children (like the 3-year-olds
studied by Rakoczy et al. 2004) tended to perform the same kind of unsuccessful
actions. Their non-verbal comments revealed their disappointment and they often
enriched the experimenter’s actions. The same pattern of behaviour, though in a less
robust way, was displayed by the 22-month-olds.
Thus, children are able to distinguish between two situations which would be the
same for someone unable to understand the intentional nature of pretence. A child
understanding pretence as an (unintentional) as-if-behaviour would not be able to
distinguish between different as-if actions, such as pretence, trying to do and
mistakenly doing X. The authors conclude that young children already have the
concept of pretence as an intentional action. That is, in their view children
understand pretence as an intentional activity of making as-if something were the
case. Such a conceptualisation allows them to distinguish pretence from other
similar activities such as trying to do X or mistakenly doing X.
It is in fact controversial whether pretending is an intentional activity, at least if
this means that pretending depends on something like specific fictive intentions [for
a positive and a negative view on this, see respectively Currie (1990) and Walton
(1990), who adopts the causal-inferentialist stance on pretence defended also by
Harris et al. (1994)]. Whatever the solution one gives to this problem, Friedman and
Leslie (2007) have recently discussed some cases of pretence which are problematic
in both pure ‘behaving-as-if’- theories and the intentionalist ‘behaving-as-if’-
theories proposed by Rakoczy and Tomasello (2006). Suppose a child pretends that
a pencil is a car: (s)he pushes the pencil along a path making a ‘‘vroom, vroom’’
sound. Now, according to a pure ‘behaving-as-if’- theory, the child would not be
pretending at all for the behaviour the child actually engages in is too far removed
from the behaviour (s)he should engage in: if the pencil were a car, she would
neither push it nor make engine noises. But neither does the intentionalist
‘behaving-as-if’- theories fare any better. As the authors show, the theory has to
become extremely complex in order to accommodate such a simple case of
children’s pretence. The simple rule ‘‘the child (intentionally) acts in a way that
would be appropriate if x were a y’’ should be expanded into a disjunctive rule such
as ‘‘the child (intentionally) acts in a way that would be appropriate if x were a y
OR the child (intentionally) makes x move in a way that would be appropriate if x
were a y OR the child (intentionally) produces sounds that x would produce if x
were a y’’. And the expansion of the behavioural rule necessary to accommodate
4 To be sure, someone not persuaded by the importance of introducing ‘creative props’ could observe that
the experiment still elicit imitation. Yet, since imitation can be performed at different levels of
complexity, Rakoczy et al. might precisely retort that the imitation in question does not regard the mere
behaviour of the experimenter, but the imitation of his/her intentional actions.
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children’s comprehension rather than production of the same pretend situation
would be even more complex.
Nevertheless, if Rakoczy et al. think that pretending is intentional in the sense
that involves awareness of one’s own activity, then they raise an interesting point.
From this perspective, their criticism is aligned with metarepresentational critiques
of ‘multiple models’- approaches. For, as we have seen above, not only are these
latter approaches actually put in the same basket as the ‘behaving-as-if’- theories
that Rakoczy et al. bring into question, but also their account of pretence merely in
terms of first-order rather than of second-order representations, which is what
metarepresentations are, is ultimately unsuccessful. Let us examine this point more
in detail.
As Leslie sees it, decoupling first-order representations is not sufficient to make-
believe. For him, it is not enough to appeal to multiple models insofar as pretence is
a metarepresentational phenomenon. Leslie (1994) gives the following account. The
decoupled representation is the object of another computational process, leading to
the construction of an informational relation, which Leslie calls Metarepresentation
or M-representation. Figure 1 shows the structure of a Leslian metarepresentation.
A metarepresentation is an attitude which is conceived as a relation between an
agent and two representations belonging to two different semantic levels, literal and
non-literal (that is, a primary and a secondary representation).
Perner (1991) has replied that pretence is not metarepresentational at all. As
already emphasised, all the child needs is to be able to build multiple
representational models, a reality model and a model for imaginary situations
(the pretend model) and to decouple the fictional representation by putting it in the
pretend model. Metarepresentational ability is involved only when the child begins
explicitly to attribute states of pretence to him/herself and to others.
In ascribing to Leslie a metarepresentational conception of pretence, Perner seems
to mobilise a different notion of metarepresentation. For Perner, a metarepresentation
is an interpreted metarepresentation, that is, a representation taken as having
a representation as its object; more precisely, it is a representation of a representation
Metarepresentation 
Agent Informational relation 
Primary representation Secondary representation 
Mummy pretends (of) the banana (that) it’s a telephone 
Fig. 1 From Leslie and Roth (1993)
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qua representation, that is as something which has an interpretation and not as
something which at most is a mere (syntactic) vehicle of information. In Leslie’s view,
a metarepresentation is on the contrary just an informational relation between an agent
and two representations, which does not require those representations to be
interpreted.5 Thus, Leslie is not a metarepresentationalist on pretence, at least in the
sense that he does not say that pretence is metarepresentational in the sense of this
notion that Perner mobilises. From now on, we will stick to Perner’s sense of this
notion.
Notwithstanding the fact that the standard interpretation of Leslie’s position
coming from Perner is a bit misleading as a result, one has to admit that Leslie’s
position is also open to an interpretation that makes him in any event a
metarepresentationalist on pretence in the sense of the notion of metarepresentation
that Perner has in mind, though in a weak form rather than the strong one criticised
above by Perner. Let us explain.
A central step in Leslie’s reasoning, which is not actually developed by the author,
is the parallelism between first- and third-person pretence. His line of reasoning is
simple: he remarks that the child begins to play solitary pretence at the same age (s)he
begins to understand pretence in others. For example, (s)he uses a banana as a
telephone when (s)he also understands mummy acting as-if the banana were a
telephone. Given that to understand pretence in others requires a metarepresentational
ability, Leslie adds the (somewhat unjustified) comment that the same, actually
computational, process is presumed to be involved in solitary pretence.
According to Leslie, the above analysis of pretence shows that there is an
isomorphism between attribution of pretence states and attribution of beliefs,
desires and other mental states.6 This claim, which goes far beyond the scope of this
paper, is central to Leslie’s hypothesis that pretence is the first manifestation of
development of ToMM (Theory of Mind Mechanism), the metarepresentational
mechanism which in the nativist-modular version of the theory underlies human
folk psychological reasoning. These topics are dealt with further in Sect. 6.
All in all, this shows that for Leslie, although pretence is not straightforwardly
metarepresentational in Perner’s sense, Pernerean metarepresentations are involved
in pretence because (implicit) (self-)attribution of a state of pretence is always
involved in it and that (self-)attribution is precisely a metarepresentation in Perner’s
sense, for (self-) attribution is a representation of a representational state qua
representational. In other words since, as we have seen, for Leslie pretence requires
the ascription of states of pretence themselves, Leslie goes on to appeal to
metarepresentationalism in a Pernerean sense, even though in a weaker form than
that Perner (erroneously) ascribes to him: definitely, for him pretence does not
consist in a metarepresentation taken as a representation of a representation qua
representation, yet it involves such metarepresentations. To put it in Currie’s
5 Incidentally, since for Leslie a metarepresentation is a computational relation between an agent and
other representation, is also subpersonal. On the contrary Perner is not committed to this idea.
6 According to Leslie, each semantic property of mental states’ ascriptions has a correspondence in one
of the three basic forms of pretence: referential opacity corresponds to object substitution; nonentailment
of truth or falsehood corresponds to attribution of pretend properties; and nonentailment of existence
corresponds to creation of imaginary objects (see 1997:416 for details).
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(1998:41) terms, the idea is that although pretence is not a metarepresentation,
having metarepresentations in this sense is a necessary condition for pretending.
Undoubtedly, by taking the possession of a metarepresentation as a mere
necessary, and not also sufficient, condition for pretending, this form of
metarepresentationalism is weaker than the one Perner (erroneously) ascribes to
Leslie. Yet one might wonder whether Perner would find that such a weakening
makes a real difference with respect to the stronger metarepresentationalist position.
As this weaker metarepresentationalism intends to account for the fact that pretence
is taken to go along with ascription of pretence, Perner would perhaps retort that
even this weak metarepresentationalism on pretence is not necessary to account for
the phenomena in question. For in order to account for pretence itself and not for its
attribution to someone, even the subject itself of the pretending activity, the
mobilisation of multiple models is sufficient.
To deal with this possible criticism by Perner, another intermediate hypothesis is
defended by Jarrolds et al. (1994), who point out that different kinds of pretence
require different cognitive processes. More precisely, metarepresentations (in the
above sense) are necessary only when, at around 30 months of age, children begin
to engage in cooperative make-believe, in which reciprocal roles are negotiated. In
fact, it is only at this level of complexity that children have to attribute states of
pretence to their peers and to themselves. Yet for these authors the underlying idea
remains that the implication of the metarepresentational level is tied merely to the
attribution of fictionality. That is, even if ascribing pretence to someone else is a
metarepresentational affair, pretending per se is not. Hence, these authors are not
that far from Perner’s original idea that pretence does not need a metarepresen-
tational ability but may be successfully handled by means of multiple cognitive
models.
Let us at this point take stock. We have seen that Perner’s way of developing
Leslie’s original idea on decoupling by appealing to multiple models provides a
very fruitful treatment of pretence. Yet it is hard to escape the feeling that
although pretence is not metarepresentational, in the Pernerean sense of a
second-order representation of a representation, metarepresentations in this sense
are still in some way involved in pretence. As will be seen below, Perner
himself has attempted to say something more on this subject. In what follows,
we will therefore try to account for the appropriateness of this feeling by
developing a metarepresentationalist approach, which is however even weaker
than the two main metarepresentational approaches presented here: that is, it is
weaker not only (and obviously) than the strong approach according to which
pretence is metarepresentational, but also than the weak approach that pretence
entails metarepresentations.
4 Why an even weaker metarepresentationalist account is needed
As hinted at previously, the theoretical merits of the simple representationalist
position towards pretence, along with Perner’s above-mentioned criticisms of
Leslie’s account, do not mean that the metarepresentational approach to pretence is
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bound to fail. Certainly, qua simulative activity, to pretend something means to
display oneself imaginatively in a different scenario, hence—as we have seen—to
activate a representational model different from the model one mobilises when
representing the real world.
Yet the mere activation of a representative model in which an imaginary world
is represented is far from accounting for pretence. One may say rather that being
fully involved in some sort of delusory thought, in which one represents things as
they do not actually stand, is tantamount to merely activating an imaginary
representational model. The paradigmatic case of such a cognitive situation is
dreaming. In dreaming, for instance, a subject simply activates a model in which
an imaginary world is represented. But also some forms of hallucinatory thought,
like for example some forms of schizophrenic thought, can be easily dealt with in
this way. In erroneously believing that his wife has been replaced by an impostor
(and chopping off her head in order to check that this is so), a subject obsessed by
Capgras delusion is activating a model in which an imaginary world is represented
while temporarily suspending his/her cognitive contact with the real world.7 Other
less tragic cases of deluded thought can be handled in the same way as with cases
of Anton’s syndrome, in which blind patients behave as if they can see—for this
and other similar cases, cf. Young (2000). From the cognitive perspective, in
general, things indeed stand for the deluded subject as if (s)he faced an imaginary
world, although (s)he lives and (unfortunately) acts in the real world as always.
Yet, a pretending subject is precisely not a deluded subject: in representing an
alternative world, the pretending subject endorses no cognitive illusion or mistake,
(s)he is not betrayed by what (s)he represents. As Lillard (2002b:194) herself
acknowledges, ‘‘if children did not hold the pretence world separate from the real
one, they would become confused’’.
On behalf of Perner, one could well reply that the difference between
pretending on the one hand and these cognitively delusory situations on the other
stands as follows. While the deluded subject only activates the imaginary model
(because (s)he does not know that that model is not a model of the real world),
the pretending subject simultaneously activates both the pretend model and the
reality model.
But even this is not enough. For the mere simultaneous activation of the
imaginary and of the reality model accounts for the cognitive situation of somehow
dissociated subjects, namely subjects who experience a world of their own and still
do not lose their grip on the real world. Here, sleepwalkers are the paradigmatic case
of this kind of subjects. A sleepwalker may well mobilise both the reality model,
notably a perceptual one—this is what allows him/her to walk around in the real
world avoiding obstacles—and an imaginary model—in which (s)he represents the
world (s)he is dreaming about. Yet (s)he is not pretending anything. Properly
considered, a sleepwalker is nothing but an extreme daydreamer. Clearly, a
daydreamer mobilises both an imaginary model, concerning his/her mind’s
7 For this way of dealing with the Capgras delusion, see Sass (1994). According to Currie (2000),
typically the subject here is merely imagining, while erroneously thinking that his/her imagination is a
belief about the real world.
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wanderings in an imaginary world, and the reality model, enabling him/her still to
perceive the real world while daydreaming. Yet again, (s)he is not pretending
anything. Thus, even imagining while perceiving is not enough in order for someone
to pretend (again, see Walton 1973, 1990).8 In actual fact, many other subjects are in
the same cognitive situation. Take people affected by the most famous case of
Cotard delusion, namely subjects who believe that they are dead. Although these
subjects represent themselves as dead, they mainly behave as ordinary subjects do.
With regard to the afore-mentioned Capgras syndrome, moreover, it would be better
to consider most patients as dissociated rather than as hallucinated. While saying
that a close relative has been substituted by an impostor, they behave in a friendly
manner towards this ‘impostor’ and generally do not denounce him/her. So, all these
subjects are suitably interpreted as people whose odd beliefs are not integrated into
a single belief system (Young 2000). In this respect, they appear to be subject to the
same predicament as those suffering from hemianopia. Although the latter seem to
perceive the world in a very distorted way, as if it corresponded to what they depict
in their visual representations, they do not lose cognitive control of the world as it
really is (Bisiach 1988). Thus, appealing to mere multiple representational models,
as involved by resorting to a decoupling mechanism, is not enough in order to
account for pretence.
On behalf of the ‘multiple models’- account, one might remark that, unlike a
dissociated subject, the activation of the ‘pretend’- model does not lead its subject to
act or anyway to entertain a reason for acting such as a belief. Unlike the former
subject, who—admittedly dimly—believes e.g. that his/her relative has been
replaced by an impostor (while also failing to believe that), the latter subject simply
fails to believe e.g. that a slime on the screen is attacking him/her, (s)he merely
pretends to believe that. Yet far from supporting the ‘multiple models’- account, this
mere failure to believe and to subsequently act in the pretence case is evidence that
something more is required than the mere activation of two different representa-
tional models. For if this mere activation were all that there is cognitively at stake,
then the subject would not merely lack the relevant belief, (s)he would precisely
also have it (in the reality model)!
It is time for us to formulate our proposal. The difference between a pretending
subject and a dissociated subject lies the fact that the former acknowledges that the
representations entertained in the pretend model are not to be lumped together with
the representations (s)he simultaneously entertains in the reality model. This is what
enables him/her to entertain contradictory representations simultaneously (going
back to Leslie’s afore-mentioned example, ‘‘this is a banana’’ and ‘‘this is not a
banana’’). It is not only a question of (s)he putting these representations in different
representational boxes, as even the dissociated subject does. Unlike the latter, (s)he
also takes these representations as belonging to such distinct boxes. Once again
Lillard (2002a:104) is forced to recognise this: ‘‘a pretender must be aware of the
actual situation and the nonactual, represented one, or else (s)he is mistaken, not
8 This seems to escape Currie (1995:144–145, 148), who equates pretending with imagining. To be sure,
Currie is well aware that there is a difference between a pretending mind and an imaginative mind such as
that of a daydreamer, if not also that of a hallucinatory subject. Yet he describes this distinction as an
unconscious switch from having pretend to having real beliefs (ibid:162-3 and fn. 26).
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pretending’’.9 Thus, pretence involves a metarepresentational level. For it involves
the acknowledgement, or the awareness, that a certain representation is to put in a
representational model different from the one in which another representation is put;
as awareness is in its own turn a form of representation, pretence involves the
representation of a representation.
In this respect, the aforementioned behavioural data found in Rakoczy et al.
(2004) and Rakoczy and Tomasello (2006) are very important. They show that
pretending subjects differ cognitively not only from subjects entertaining delusory
thoughts, who in our categorisation merely activate the imaginary model, but also
from dissociated subjects, who simultaneously entertain different representational
models. In actual fact, the cheerful piece of behaviour (laughing and smiling) that
pretending children manifest definitely distinguishes them from younger children
who, like deluded subjects, exhibit a ‘trying’—kind of behaviour insofar as they
erroneously take things to be what they are not—for instance, they unsuccessfully
try to drink from an empty glass, by thinking that it is not empty, rather than smiling
as they deal with the glass by pretending that it is not empty. Yet that piece of
behaviour also distinguishes pretending children from dissociated subjects who
simultaneously take things to be what they are and what they are not. Presumably, a
dissociated subject who imagines him/herself to be dead and also takes him/herself
to be alive engages in the same apparently contrasting form of behaviour that a child
pretending to be dead would perform, for example by refusing to eat and at the same
time eating the snack Mummy gives him/her to feed him/her baby. Yet unlike a
pretending subject, the dissociated subject would not wink (smile, etc.) at anybody.
Certainly, on the one hand the fact that the pretending subject has such an
awareness does not mean that pretence is metarepresentational in the strong sense of
being a representation of a representation which, following Perner, is commonly
ascribed to Leslie. As we have just said, by involving that awareness, pretending
involves the representation of a representation, yet it is not in itself a
metarepresentation.
On the other hand, such an awareness is not even a ‘Cartesian’ second-order
knowledge of, or at least a second-order belief in, the fictional aspect of the fiction
one is engaged in—the knowledge or belief one would linguistically express by
whistling to oneself ‘‘it’s only make-believe’’. In point of fact, in taking Leslie’s
position non-commonly as merely ascribing this belief to pretending subjects, the
conception ascribing that ‘Cartesian’ knowledge to such subjects can be seen as
retreating from the strong claim that pretence is metarepresentational to the weak
claim that pretence requires a second-order belief of the form ‘‘S pretends that p’’,
hence to the weak claim that pretence involves this kind of metarepresentation. Yet,
insofar as 18-month-old pretending children may well lack the notion of pretence
itself (or of fiction for that matter), pretence can hardly involve metarepresentation
9 Lillard (2002a:104) takes this awareness as one of the defining feature of pretence. Thus, one may take
her as another supporter of the minimal metarepresentationalist view we are defending. This is not
however very clear. For the text we have quoted in the text can be also interpreted either as an alternative
formulation of the Pernerian point of view (with ‘‘being aware of’’ as simply meaning ‘‘representing’’) or
as an alternative formulation of the point of view standardly (after Perner) ascribed to Leslie (with ‘‘being
aware of’’ as meaning ‘‘representing to oneself the (actual or nonactual) representation of a situation’’).
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not only in the strong but also in this weak sense. Nevertheless, it is hard not to take
the awareness that even 18-month-old children may well manifest, as still being
metarepresentational in nature. In having such an awareness, one indeed non-
notionally represents first-order representations as being differently located (in
one’s mind). In this even weaker, or minimal, sense, we take it that pretence
involves metarepresentation. In the next section, we will further qualify this
minimal sense, by distinguishing our position from two close accounts, one which
either is not metarepresentational or it actually collapses onto ours, and another one
which is actually ‘Cartesianly’ metarepresentational in the aforementioned sense.
5 How to tell the minimal metarepresentationalism on pretence from close
accounts
To begin with, let us note that some followers of Perner have acknowledged that
pretence needs something more than the mere mobilisation of distinct representa-
tional models. A collating mind is requested. Its job is seemingly to compare or
assemble representations inscribed in the aforementioned distinct representational
models—cf. Olson (1993) and particularly Suddendorf (1999), Suddendorf and
Whiten (2001). For all of them, however, the collating mind, hence pretence as well,
is still not metarepresentational. So, one might wonder, does not our account of
pretence coincide with that of the supporters of a collating mind?
To face this question, we will try to defend the following three claims: (a) the job
performed by the collating mind, as described by its supporters, is not enough in
order for someone to pretend; (b) even if, contrary to fact, it were enough, the
collating mind would be metarepresentational in the same, minimal, sense in which,
in our account, the pretending subject is; so, it is the ‘collating mind’- account that
collapses onto ours, not the other way round; (c) the reason why the collating mind,
or our pretending mind for that matter, is not understood by those authors to be
metarepresentational is that they entertain a poorly articulated concept of
metarepresentation. Let us look at these points in detail.
As to (a), to begin with it is not very clear what, according to its defenders, the
collating mind is supposed to do in order to pretend something. Suddendorf and
Whiten (2001:632) suggest that this mind activates a third collating representation
over and above the two representations activated in the reality and in the imaginary
model respectively. Coming back to Leslie’s example, over and above ‘‘this is a
banana’’ (reality model) and ‘‘this is a telephone’’ (imaginary model), the collating
mind activates the collating representation ‘‘this banana is a telephone’’. Yet it is
hard to see in which sense this third representation performs some task that the
second fails to perform. If the concept of a banana is semantically inert in the
complex demonstrative ‘‘this banana’’, the third representation simply collapses
onto the second. If it is not inert, it is still the case that both the complex
demonstrative and the simple demonstrative ‘‘this’’ involved in the second
representation (as well as in the first representation for that matter) refer to the
same (real) thing.
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Olson (1993) suggests instead that the third, collating, representation focuses on
the fact that the real object represented in the representation belonging to the reality
model (in our example, the banana) is a substitute for the imaginary object
represented in the representation belonging to the imaginary model (in our example,
the telephone); for example, ‘‘the banana stands for the telephone’’. For the sake of
argument, let us accept that the collating representation is correct in presenting that
what the first representation is about acts as a proxy for what the second
representation is about.10 But it is in fact hard to conceive the general notion of
pretending in terms of the relation of standing for something. Perner himself would
be perplexed, as he takes the notion of pretending that such and such is the case and
the notion of something standing for something else (which is sometimes actually
rubricated as pretending that that very something is that something else) as distinct
notions (1993:52–53, 57–59, 288–289).11
To this Olson would probably reply that he proposes an account of pretending x
to be y not merely in terms of (representing) x (as) standing for y, but rather in terms
of (representing) x (as) standing for y plus representing x (in the reality model) and
representing y (in the imaginary model). But even so, pretending that x is y is just
one kind of pretence. As we have seen at the very beginning of this paper, one may
even pretend that there is something, an imaginary object, which in actual fact does
not exist (for example, that there is a train while in (the relevant portion of) reality
there are no trains). Now, this form of pretence is hardly accountable for in the
above terms, for even though one might say that also in this case one mobilises
representations of real objects in the reality model and a representation of the
imaginary object in the imaginary model, there is really no representation to the
effect that some real object stands for the imaginary object.
To be sure, champions of the collating mind might here say that creative
pretence, that is, pretence centred on the fact that there is an object which does not
actually exist, appears later in children’s development. As Suddendorf (1999:248)12
seems to suggest, from looking at autistic children’s behaviour, the ability to
imagine unreal things comes later than the ability to imagine that a real thing is
different from how it actually is. Hence, creative pretence is not something that has
to be explained by appealing to a collating mind. Yet this genetic hypothesis is
countered by the fact that 18-month-old children appear to understand precisely
creative pretence (as when they understand someone else’s objectless gestures as
pretending that (s)he is using a hammer—as Lillard (2002b:194) reminds us).
10 Walton, for one, would be skeptical about that. He says (1990) that the first object, what the first
representation is about, is a prop in a make-believe game, which is not the same as being proxy for
another object, what the second representation is about. For him, even expressions in literary texts are
props in the make-believe game, which definitely does not mean that they stand for the (imaginary)
characters whose vicissitudes are recounted in such texts.
11 Someone might also be perplexed yet for the opposite reason, namely that it is the very notion of x
standing for y that must be reconstructed in terms of the notion of pretending. In this respect, it would not
be the case that, as Perner maintains, pretending that x is such and such and pretending that x is y are
distinct notions; the latter would simply be a specification of the former. On this hypothesis we want here
to remain neutral; but it seems at least that symbolic capacity presupposes comprehension of pretence.
See Lillard (2002b:200).
12 See also the texts quoted in Lillard (2002a:112).
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Furthermore, imagining imaginary objects is precisely mobilised in the above
account of the collating mind (the representation in the imaginary model is precisely
taken to be a representation of an imaginary object, in our example the (actually
nonexistent) telephone). In any case, as we have also seen at the outset, there is still
another form of pretence, that of pretending that something is F—for example, that
a doll’s face is dirty—which is as simple as the pretence that x is y and yet again, it
does not involve anything like (representing) something (as) standing for something
else.
As to (b), let us nevertheless assume, for argument’s sake, that Olson’s proposal
gives a good account of pretence. Yet pace Olson, this account is metarepresen-
tational. For the third, collating, representation he puts forward actually is a
metarepresentation, namely a representation that something represents (stands for)
something else!13 As a result, there would accordingly be no basic distinction
between our minimal metarepresentational account of pretence and the ‘collating
mind’- account: they both account for pretence in metarepresentational terms. In
other words, if a collating mind needs a metarepresentation, then the ‘collating
mind’- account collapses into our minimal metarepresentationalist account, not the
other way round.
As to (c), a supporter of the ‘collating mind’- account might at this point bite the
bullet. By appealing to Perner himself, (s)he might claim that, if his/her account
collapses onto ours, then neither of them is metarepresentational. For whatever the
representational task performed by the collating mind, or our pretending mind for that
matter, may be it is not metarepresentational. As seen above, according to Perner, in
order for something to be a representation, it must not only be a representation of
something but a representation of something as being in a certain way. Hence, in order
for something to be a metarepresentation, it must not only be a representation of a
representation, but it must also be a representation of a representation as being in a
certain way—namely, as being a representation (1991:19–20, 35). Since the collating
mind, or our pretending mind, does not represent a representation as being a
representation, it performs no metarepresentational task.
At the end of the previous section, we said that our account is even more weakly
metarepresentational than the ‘Cartesian’ one non-commonly ascribed to Leslie,
according to which pretence involves metarepresentation. For unlike the latter, it
does not appeal to the notion of pretence itself. By addressing the previous reply of
the supporter of the ‘collating mind’- account, we can now positively clarify in what
sense our account is still metarepresentational, although in an even weaker sense
than the ‘Cartesian’ approach.
We must be very careful here. If by ‘‘to represent a representation as a representation’’
one means that the notion of a representation—or any other notions of the same kind—
has to be mobilised in the very content of a metarepresentation, as some Pernerians
maintain—cf. Suddendorf (1999:234) and Perner (1991:19–20, 35) himself, then it is
clear that the collating mind, or our pretending mind, is not metarepresentational. In our
case, no metarepresentation in this sense in involved: one may well acknowledge that
13 Curiously enough, this seems to be acknowledged by Perner himself (1991:37–38); see also
Suddendorf (1999:245).
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certain representations are distinctly located, as our pretending mind is supposed to do,
even though the content of that acknowledgement does not contain the notion of
representation itself. In this respect, the notion of a representation is in the same boat as
the notion of a model. As Perner (1991:33–34) says, children do not explicitly know that
the locations of their different representations are distinct representational models, the
reality and the pretend model, Rather, they have a sort of procedural, of functional,
knowledge of the distinction between such models, namely, they procedurally know that
they activate an imaginary model alongside a different, reality, model. Yet if by ‘‘to
represent a representation as a representation’’ one simply means that the representation
in its mere, or crude, defining role, namely, the representation qua instantiation of the
relation of representing without being conceived as such,14 has to be represented in the
metarepresentation—as Pylyshyn (1978:573), from whom Perner (1991:35) borrows
the concept of metarepresentation, originally suggested—then the collating mind, or our
pretending mind, is metarepresentational. For, insofar as the content of one’s thought
contains not the notion of a representation, but that very representation itself, then that
thought is still metarepresentational. As far as first-order thoughts are concerned, it is
typical after McDowell (1982) to draw a distinction between singular thoughts—those
having individuals as their constituents, as the thought that Mont Blanc is more than
4,000 m high, having Mont Blanc among its constituents—and general thoughts, those
involving notions as their constituents, as the thought that the mountain between
Chamonix and Courmayeur is more than 4,000 m high, having the notion of being a
mountain between Chamonix and Courmayeur among its constituents. Now, metarep-
resentations having representations in their own content are simply second-order
singular thoughts, while representations having a notion of a representation in thir own
content are second-order general thoughts. To sum up, one has to distinguish between
general metarepresentations—those containing the notion of representation in their
content—and singular metarepresentations—those containing the very representations,
as mere instances of the representing relation, in their content.15
14 See Perner: ‘‘a representation is something that stands in a representing relation to something else’’
(1991:18).
15 Although sometimes singular thoughts are also labeled de re thoughts (cf. e.g. Recanati 1993), it is
better to stick to our terminology. For the distinction between general and singular metarepresentations
does not match the close distinction between de dicto and de re readings of pretence reports. This not only
because the latter is a distinction concerning language, notably the way a reporter reports someone’s
intentional states, not intentional states themselves—a point often stressed in the literature, cf. e.g.
Bonomi (1995)—but also because if there were anything like a genuinely de re metarepresentation, unlike
a singular metarepresentation this might well be causally inert (cf. e.g. Oedipus’ belief of his mother that
she has married him). Moreover, the distinction between general and singular metarepresentations has to
do with a difference in their content—a general versus a singular content. Note finally that this distinction
can be drawn independently of assessing a further issue regarding whether a singular metarepresentation
simply contains its primary object, that is, the first-order representation it is about, or it also, or rather,
contains a non-conceptual content picking up that very first-order representation. For positions
maintaining these latter options cf. respectively Schiffer (1978) and Fodor (2007). This issue is relevant
when one addresses the question of whether a singular metarepresentation also has a perspectival nature.
Perspectivality indeed comes into the fore when, unbenownst to a person, two singular metarepresen-
tations may be about the very same representation, so that that very subject may endorse the first while
rejecting the second metarepresentation. (Here we simply have at a second-order level the well-known
problem Frege (1892) originally raised for first-order representations, or thoughts). For the purposes of
this paper, however, this question can be put aside (but see footnote 17 below).
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Thus, in holding that a collating mind, or a pretending mind for that matter, is not
metarepresentational, Pernereans probably miss the distinction between general and
singular metarepresentations, which is the mere application to representations of
representations of a distinction to be normally made with respect to simple
representations. In actual fact, Pernereans merely compare what in our terminology
are general metarepresentations with representations caused by other representa-
tions and claim that only the former are genuine metarepresentations—cf.
Suddendorf and Whiten (2001:630) and Perner (1991:37–38) himself. Now, we
agree that being caused by a representation is not sufficient for something to be a
metarepresentation. But a singular metarepresentation is not something which is
merely caused by a representation; as we said, it is something which contains the
very representation in its content, is—inter alia—about that representation.16 Now,
both the strong metarepresentational account of pretence traditionally attributed to
Leslie and the weak metarepresentational account also ascribable to Leslie, which
adopts the ‘pretence-requires-belief’- form, involve general metarepresentations:
they respectively take that pretence is or involves a metarepresentation of the form
‘‘S pretends that a (certain) representation is F’’, a representation which has another
representation qua representation in its own content. In contrast our even weaker, or
better minimal, metarepresentational account, which is still of the ‘pretence-
requires-belief’- kind, simply involves singular metarepresentations: a collating
mind, or a pretending mind, requires children to mobilise metarepresentations, but
only in the singular sense: ‘‘S pretends that this—which is a representation—is
F’’.17
Let us reiterate this point in other terms. By speaking of an even weaker, or minimal,
metarepresentational account of pretence, we do not mean that our account is not
metarepresentational, but simply that pretence involves metarepresentations which
are not conceived as representational by their subjects. That is to say, the content of
their metarepresentations contains representations, but not qua representations: it is
not conceptual with respect to those representations. Pretending subjects have to be
aware that their real representations are distinct from their imaginary representations.
16 One—typically, a naturalist about aboutness—might maintain that being in a causal relation with a
certain object is a necessary condition of aboutness. Yet even strict naturalists would agree that it cannot
be a sufficient condition of aboutness—as, for example, Fodor (1990:91) says: thoughts may be caused
‘‘in all sorts of ways’’, and yet all these ways do not make those thoughts be about those causes.
17 Following Leslie (1997:416), one might still rejoin that in order for pretence to involve
metarepresentations, their reports must be opaque (for any pair of such reports which merely differ in
coreferential expressions figuring in their embedded sentences, these sentences cannot be substituted in
such reports salva veritate), and reports of singular metarepresentations are not such. To begin with, it is
not clear in which sense the reports that pretence would involve are opaque. Perhaps the singular terms
‘‘the banana’’ and ‘‘the telephone’’ are not substitutable salva veritate; but this does not depend on the fact
that they occur as embedded in reports different only in ordinarily coreferential expressions figuring in
their embedded sentences. For there is no such fact—the reports ‘‘Mummy pretends that the banana
rings’’ and ‘‘Mummy pretends that the telephone rings’’ are not such since ‘‘the banana’’ and ‘‘the
telephone’’ do not ordinarily corefer. It depends rather on the fact that such terms occur in the expression
of the primary representation and in what reports the metarepresentation respectively as standing for
distinct objects—the real object and the imaginary object. But even putting this problem aside, it is still
the case that certainly reports of general metarepresentations are ordinarily taken to be opaque, yet what
has still to be proved is that pretence must involve such reports.
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In order for such an awareness to have those representations in its content, however,
those subjects do not need to conceive these representations as representations. This is
by no means surprising. For it is just another case in which one knows that a is not b,
without mobilising the concepts under which a and b respectively fall.
Incidentally, once we have this distinction between singular and general
metarepresentations at our disposal, we can easily reinterpret some of the other
things that Perner goes on to say. On the one hand, Perner (1999:9) claims that a
young child merely entertaining multiple models is simply a situation theorist.
When (s)he will be 4-year-old, (s)he will become a representation theorist, really
capable of having metarepresentations. For in entertaining different representational
models, the young child simply focuses distinct situations—a real one and an
imaginary one—insofar as (s)he does not know that what (s)he actually mobilises
are distinct representations of those situations. Now, let us put aside the issue of
whether it is appropriate to describe this child as focusing in such models different
situations, a real and an imaginary one.18 Our point is that, regardless of the way the
young child effectively conceptualises what (s)he is entertaining, (s)he acknowl-
edges of the two ‘things’ that (s)he is entertaining that they are differently located.
As has already been stated, this is enough for his/her mind to be metarepresen-
tational, even if only at the singular level: the child acknowledges that this—which
is a representation of the ‘real’ model—is not be ranked with that—which is a
representation of the ‘imaginary’ model.
Up to now, we have shown that, by appealing to singular metarepresentations,
our account of pretence is either stronger than the ‘collating mind’- account,
insofar this is not metarepresentational at all, or it forces that account to collapse
onto itself. By the same token, we can now see how our account distinguishes
itself from another amendment of Perner’s original position this time made by
Perner himself.
In point of fact, Perner is not foreign to the idea that there must be something
over and above the mere mobilisation of distinct representational models in order
for someone to pretend. He himself points out that a certain awareness of the
models’ being distinct is important (1991:9, 54, 66). Thus, Perner appears to be
aware that even simultaneously entertaining distinct representations in different
models is not sufficient for pretending. In his view (1991:66), this means that the
two models have to be integrated into a single all-encompassing model, the pretend-
reality model. This model nests both the pretend and the reality model. In Recanati’s
(2000:83–84) interpretation of the situation at stake, this integration manages to
account for the aforementioned ability of a pretending subject not to be confused by
(s)he possibly mobilising contradictory representations (actually, in different
models). For the representation belonging to the pretend model presents a state of
affairs included in a hyperinsulated world, namely, that state of affairs is a persistent
18 For the different representational models can easily contain both true and false representations with
respect to the world of the model. Hence, it may well be the case that by means of a representation in a
model the representing subject focuses no situation, for insofar as the representation is false with respect
to the world of the model, that world contains no corresponding situation. This point probably escapes
Perner as the way he construes his models leads him to think that models only contain representations that
are true with respect to the world of the model (cf. fn. 1).
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state that does not hold in the world of the integrating model. Consequently,
representing in the pretend model that, for example, this is a telephone means
representing a state of affairs that does not hold in the world of the integrating
model, which can therefore contain also the contradictory representation.
However, nesting the pretend model in another model amounts to attributing to
pretence the ‘Cartesian’ metarepresentational feature that obtains in the ‘pretence-
requires-(second-order)belief’- account. For such nesting precisely occurs when,
from outside a fiction, we speak of that very fiction when we say ‘‘In fiction F, p’’—
typically, but not necessarily, from the perspective of reality (sometimes even from
the perspective of another fiction, as it happens whenever we are dealing with a
‘story-within-a-story’ mechanism). But in order to do that, we need precisely the
notion of fiction which is required so as to have a ‘Cartesian’ metarepresentational
conception of pretence. But this is tantamount to saying that Perner’s amendment
requires general metarepresentations. In this respect it turns out that, pace Perner,
his amended conception precisely merges at least into the weak form in which the
Leslian account can be reconstructed, the form of the ‘pretence-requires-(second-
order)-belief’- kind that makes pretence appeal to general metarepresentations. Yet
as we said above, once an even weaker metarepresentationalist account appealing to
mere singular metarepresentations is available, there is no longer need to pursue this
amendment.
Probably in order to avoid this (for him) unwelcome metarepresentationalist
result, Perner retreats to the weaker thesis that the integrating model is not strictly
speaking required to account for all forms of pretence, but just for a more mature
one that appears in children’s development immediately after they are 18 months
old (1999:66–68).
Yet once we have both singular and general metarepresentations, we can easily
deal with the situation at issue. The young pretending child is as metarepresen-
tationalist as the older one; simply, whereas the first entertains mere singular
metarepresentations, the second is led progressively to entertain general metarep-
resentations that involve representational notions (such as the notion of fiction) in
their content. Hence, accounting for a pretending subject’s ability not to contradict
him/herself by appealing a` la Perner to an integrating model actually involves being
even more metarepresentationalist with respect to pretence than we are in our way
of accounting for the same data.
In other words, once one distinguishes between the two aforementioned forms of
the ‘pretence-requires-belief’- approach: a weak ‘Cartesian’ (involving general
metarepresentations) and an even weaker ‘non-Cartesian’ (involving singular
metarepresentations) approach, one can then maintain that pretence is basically
‘non-Cartesianly’ metarepresentational while allowing for some pretence to be
‘Cartesianly’ metarepresentational. The latter is the more mature pretence which
older children are already able to entertain, once they master—explicitly or
implicitly—the very notion of pretence. Thus, the basic forms of pretence such as
those recalled at the very outset of this paper—to sum up, (a) playing at being
someone else or at having different features; (b) pretending that objects are either
different things or have different features from those they actually have; (c)
pretending that there are objects or individuals that in actual fact do not exist—do
50 C. Meini, A. Voltolini
123
not involve ascribing to someone the very ability to pretend, for this would imply to
have a representation that represents that there is a representation in a fictional
model, namely to have a general metarepresentation.
In this respect, it may be correct that one needs to be able to tell more articulated
forms of pretence from a simpler one, as various authors have maintained (see Sect.
4). In particular, it may well be the case that one has to be able to tell pretence
mobilised by 31- to 36-month-old children—cooperative social pretend play—and
pretence mobilised by 37- to 48-month-old children—complex social pretend play
involving metacommunication, hence the explicit ability of saying things like ‘‘S
pretends that p’’—from the early form of pretence emerging at 18 months; see
Howes et al. (1992). Nonetheless, it would be incorrect to conclude that only the
latter forms of pretence involve metarepresentations, as Jarrolds et al. (1994:457–
458, 463–465) are tempted to do (see the aforementioned section). Rather, this
distinction can be interpreted as showing that while the early form of pretence is of
the ‘pretence-requires-belief’, kind in that it involves metarepresentations only in
the extremely weak, singular, sense we have appealed to, the later form of pretence
is also of the ‘pretence-requires-belief’ kind yet it involves general metapresen-
tations—for example, those involving ascriptions of pretence to others as well as to
the pretender him/herself—as in the account ascribable, even if not (after Perner)
commonly ascribed, to Leslie.
6 Pretence and simulation
Let us recapitulate our conclusions so far. We started out by seeing that the two
positions commonly versus non-commonly ascribed to Leslie, the strong position
according to which pretence is metarepresentational and the weak position
according to which pretence merely requires metarepresentation, are justly criticised
by a host of authors. Essentially, those criticisms appeal to the idea that pretence is
to be accounted for by simply invoking multiple models containing different first-
order representations. Yet this does not mean that the idea that pretence has to do
with metarepresentation is incorrect. For there is an even weaker way to defend the
claim that pretence requires metarepresentation, according to which pretence
requires merely acknowledging that representations of fictional worlds are to be
mentally located differently from representations of reality.
This ‘watered-down’ metarepresentationalist position on pretence is full of
interesting suggestions for the debate about the nature of folk psychology, that is
the strong human propensity to interpret behaviour in terms of mental states such
as beliefs, desires, etc. The contemporary debate on this subject is dominated by
two theoretical approaches, ‘theory theories’ and ‘simulation theories’, that
distinguish themselves in defending versus criticising a metarepresentationalist
approach on folk psychology—see, for example, Davies and Stone (1995a, b).
According to the theory theories, to interpret behaviour we use a body of
psychological knowledge. Indeed, theory theories share the idea that mentalising
is a genuinely metarepresentational activity based on the possession and
exploitation of genuine psychological knowledge. This crucial point is rejected
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by those who consider simulation to underlie naive psychology. To predict and
explain behaviour, we put ourselves in the other person’s shoes and look at what
would happen in that (possibly counterfactual) situation. This process only
involves the contribution of the decision-making mechanism, namely, the
cognitive system by which we plan and organise complex behaviour. In the well-
established model proposed by Stich and Nichols (1995), during psychological
interpretation the decision-making mechanism works off-line, taking a pretended
situation as input and organising the action plan without necessarily performing
it. Simply put, in order to predict what John, who is looking at a roaring lion
will do, we imaginatively adopt his point of view, by pretending that we are
John standing in front of a roaring lion. Whatever pretended decision is taken, it
is attributed to the simulated person. In this theoretical framework, at least in its
radical versions, metarepresentations are a sort of lexical labels attached to
simulation outputs (see Gordon 1995b:61).
Now, if our minimal version of metarepresentionalism about pretence is correct,
it turns out that, as they take pretence to be at the core of psychological
interpretation, simulation theories are committed to the thesis that folk psychology
is a genuinely metarepresentational activity. We are not committed here to the thesis
that theory theories completely collapse into simulation theories. Rather, we are
suggesting that these two approaches to folk psychology are less diverse than they
are generally presented.
The moderate simulation theory as proposed by Alvin Goldman is a case in point.
For he claims that in simulating someone else, we discover in ourselves the mental
states that we then attribute to the other person. Insofar as this simulation involves
pretending to be someone else, and we granted that—in some very weak sense at
least—pretence involves metarepresentations, one such moderate simulation theory
turns out to be a particular version of a theory theory.19
Nevertheless, a simulation theorist may retort that a metarpresentationalist
account of simulationist aproach is not compulsory. This is paradigmatically the
case with Gordon (1995a, b), who defends a radical simulation theory. According to
Gordon, during simulation we do not pretend to be the other person in the sense of
imagining to move in another’s mind. Rather, we project ourselves into the other
person’s situation (1995a:63) in a very strong sense. In simulating Mary’s situation,
I do not imagine to move in Mary’s mind, but I transform myself into Mary. ‘‘I’’
changes its referent: the identity ‘‘I = Mary’’ is established. Thanks to this
referential shift of the personal pronoun, any introspective step is removed: we do
not first attribute a mental state to ourselves and then transfer it to the other person
19 Even though in his well-articulated theory (2006) Goldman proposes a way to minimise the role of
first-person psychological knowledge, he agrees that he is defending a hybrid approach, in which
simulation co-occurs with metarepresentational processes. In point of fact, Goldman thus defends his
metarepresentationalist version of a simulation theory by also appealing to introspection. Yet this is not
essential. A simulation theorist may be both metarepresentationalist and non-introspectionist, as Fuller
(1995) and Heal (1995) claim.
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(Mary). Since we become Mary during the simulation time, no transfer is needed
(1995b:55).20
Compared with moderate approaches, that of Gordon is a good candidate for a
non-metarepresentational theory. Granted, it is controversial. At some points he
seems to suggest that we are really transformed into the other person (‘‘I shift
spatiotemporal perspectives’’, 1995a:64), while at others he explicitly talks about
pretending (1995:65). Let us concede that Gordon’s approach is not committed to
pretence.21 If simulation does not involve pretence, one is not entitled to say that,
insofar as pretence requires metarepresentational abilities, simulation is itself a
metarepresentational process. There is however a high price to be paid. What does it
mean to become the other person during simulation? In Gordon’s approach, a
simulating person as described in his papers seems to us to be a hallucinating person
who changes personality and becomes someone else. Someone who recenters his
egocentric map and not only becomes in imagination the referent of the first person
pronoun ‘‘I’’, but also begins to live in a new ‘now’ and ‘here’ (see note 20 below),
is not significantly different from a hallucinating person: he is someone who forgets
both his personality traits and his real spatio-temporal coordinates in order to
assume some new identity. As a consequence we human beings, who exercise folk
psychology all the day long, would always be victims of hallucinations. For
example, in an ordinary day we would be able to hallucinate three times to be our
friend Michele, a number of times to be someone of our relatives, one time to be
Charlie Chaplin, one time to be Penelope Cruz, and so on. Now, even a good actor
using the Stanislavskij method does not really change his personality as a simulating
person would do. In short, it seems that in reducing simulation to a hallucinatory
practice, the radical simulation theorist is stretching the notion of simulation too far;
the burden of proof is on him/her to show that his/her theory is really a simulation
theory.
At this point, a possible way to make sense of radical simulative hypotheses and
look for a properly non-metarepresentational approach requires to dig down deep to
the neurological level. In recent years, the debate on the role of simulation in folk
psychology has been greatly influenced by the discovery of mirror neurons—see
20 It is interesting to quote Gordon: ‘‘To simulate Mr Tees (i.e. someone who has missed his flight) in his
situation requires an egocentric shift, a recentering of my egocentric map on Mr Tees. He becomes in my
imagination the referent of the first person pronoun ‘I’, and the time and place of his missing the plane
become the referent of ‘now’ and ‘here’. And I, Gordon, cease to be the referent of the first person
pronoun: what is imagined is not the truth of the counter-identical ‘RMG is Mr Tees’. Such recentering is
the prelude to transforming myself in imagination into Mr Tees much as actors become the characters
they play. Although some actors (‘method’ actors, for example) occasionally step back from the role they
are playing and ask ‘What would I, myself do, think, and feel in this situation?’, and then transfer their
answer (with or without adjustments) to the character, the typical stance of modern actors is that of being,
not actors pretending to be characters in a play, but the characters themselves.’’ (1995b: 55; italics in the
original text). This idea has famous predecessors. See for instance this passage by Wollheim, in which he
accounts for a form of imagination enabling one to understand a picture pictorially: ‘‘What then happens
is that the suitable spectator, the suitable external spectator we might say, starts to identify with the
internal spectator: that is, to imagine him, the internal spectator, centrally, or from the inside, interacting
with the represented scene as the repertoire assigned to him allows or constrains him to.’’ (1998:225).
21 The real problem with Gordon’s account is another, which has to do with his behaviouristic stance: see
Meini (2007).
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Rizzolatti and Gentilucci (1988). Originally found in the premotor cortex of
macaques’ brains, mirror neurons are cells with particular properties. They
discharge not only when the animal performs an action, but also when it sees
similar actions being performed by another individual, typically a conspecific or a
human being. More recently, clusters of cells with mirror properties have been
discovered in human beings, both in the premotor cortex and in other regions of the
brain—see for example, Fadiga et al. (1995), Iacoboni et al. (2005).
Clearly, neurons that reproduce in the interpreter’s brain the action of another
agent are simulative cells. Indeed, many cognitive scientists take mirror neurons as
neurological evidence for simulation theory. In particular, in an influential paper
Gallese—one of the neurophysiologists of the Parma group that originally
discovered mirror neurons—and Goldman (1998) proposed that the simulative
activity of mirror neurons triggered when we see someone acting toward a goal is
the cue to individuate the goal itself.
Now, Gordon’s theory fits very well these neurological data. According to
Gordon, during simulation we become someone else and let our decision-making
mechanism run in a neutral space. For example, after seeing John who looks at a
barking mastiff we become John and take a behavioural decision without accessing
our mental states. It is easy to describe the very same psychological process at a
neural level: I see John facing a barking mastiff; my mirror neurons discharge and I
enter a simulative we-centric space (Gallese 2003). In this space I/John decide(s) to
run away.
The idea of grounding Gordon’s non-pretence-involving notion of simulation on
the activity of mirror neurons seems promising precisely in order to distinguish
simulation from hallucination. In simulation, but presumably not in hallucination,
mirror neurons are activated. In this case, Gordon could rely on a notion of
simulation which is independent of pretence without facing the problem of
assimilating simulation to other mental activities. Now, putting well to one side the
fact that it would be advisable to carry out brain imagery studies of hallucinatory
states, it unfortunately remains the case that neural, non-pretence-involving,
simulation is hardly rich enough to constitute the basis of mindreading in a
simulation theory approach. Let us conclude this paper with a few remarks on this
point.
When performing an action, we are typically moved by several intentions,
such as motor and prior intentions, not to speak of communicative and social
intentions. Concerning the first two, a prior intention is a non-basic goal, such as
opening the fridge to take a beer and drink it. To reach that goal, we form
different basic, motor intentions, such as to grasp the fridge handle by opening
the right hand and then closing it. More importantly for us, the same motor
intention can be involved in different non basic intentions, as showed by Jacob
and Jeannerod (2005).
Consider Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. Dr. Jekyll is a serious surgeon who
anaesthetises his patients before performing surgical operations, while Mr. Hyde is a
sadist who does not anaesthetise his patients before performing exactly the same
actions. Now, it turns out that Dr. Jekyll is Mr. Hyde. Dr. Jekyll (alias Mr. Hyde)
may execute twice the same motor sequence on two different persons (one
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anaesthetised, the other simply paralysed). Clearly, Dr Jekyll’s prior22 intention
differs from Mr. Hyde’s: whereas the former intends to cure the patient of his
disease, the latter intends to take delight in his victim’s pain. However, the two
motor intentions are identical. As a consequence, anyone watching the two surgical
operations would not notice any difference. Now, this raises a problem for the non-
metarepresentational account of simulation based on mirror neurons. At a
neurological level, we can say that simulative neurons in the brain of an observer
watching the action cannot distinguish between two quite different actions by the
agent because the superficial behaviour is identical in the two situations. But if an
observer is simulating an agent, his/her simulation should match such different
actions, not that very same superficial behaviour.
Clearly, in naı¨ve psychological reasoning the attribution of prior intentions are
crucially involved. When attributing a motor intention, we are ‘naive behaviourists’,
delivering basic interpretations which are far for being satisfactory explanations of
our actions. Then a supporter of the ‘mirror neurons’- account of simulation may
arise an important question: do mirror neurons code only basic motor intentions, or
can they identify more complex prior intentions? Until recently, no study did focus
on this question, leaving it open to philosopher’s skeptical doubts. Nevertheless,
recent empirical data on both macaques—Fogassi et al. (2005)—and humans—
Iacoboni et al. (2005)—suggest that simulative processes carried on at the neural
level by mirror neurons can code the prior intention, that is, the psychological
intention which causes the motor act. The rationale of the experiments was the
following: if mirror neurons only coded the ‘immediate’ motor intention, then they
would not be influenced by the context of an action. If we pick up a mug, our motor
intention is to take hold of it, independently of our prior intention (to drink tea or to
clean up afterwards). On the contrary, if mirror neurons coded prior intentions, then
they would be influenced by the context, because—as Jacob and Jeannerod’s
example shows—the same motor act can be performed with two psychological
goals. Now, Iacoboni et al. (2005) have shown that the context of an action
modulates the neural activity: mirror neurons increase their activity when someone
sees a hand picking up a mug from a table with objects (the mug, a teapot, some
cookies etc.) arranged as just before tea in contrast with a context where the same
objects are arranged after tea has been taken.
Thus, it may be true that in certain simple situations there is at least a one-to-one
correspondence between prior intentions and neurons’ firings. Nevertheless, one
could first remark that such covariations do not rule out a non mentalistic
alternative. As pointed out by a simulation theorist such as Goldman, a more
parsimonious interpretation would suggest that mirror neurons activity ‘‘did not
constitute the attribution of an intention, but only the prediction of an action. Since
an action is not a mental state, predicting an action would not qualify as
mindreading.’’ (2009: 240; italic by the author) Moreover, when prior intentions are
more sophisticated—as in the previous example of social intentions pointed out by
Jacob and Jeannerod—it is doubtful that neural activity matches the complexity of
22 In reality, Jacob and Jeannerod talk about ‘‘social intentions’’, but we can equally refer to prior
intentions.
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prior intentions. So, it remains that at least in complex cases, simulating someone
else’s different actions is too fine-grained in order for it to be accounted for in terms
of mirror neurons’ firings.
We cannot enter here into the complex debate on the level of analysis reached by
mirror neurons activity—prior vs. motor intention; but see (Meini 2007; Goldman
2009; Jacob 2009). In agreement with these kinds of argument, it seems to us that
what mirror neurons do is a too basic level of simulation, unable to deliver genuine
psychological interpretation. Thus, with regards to our thesis, it seems to us that the
situation could be described as follows. It may be true that there is a notion of
simulation which is not pretence-involving and that it can be based on a certain kind
of neural activity—specifically, on mirror neurons’ activity. Nonetheless, neural
simulation, which is the most interesting notion of simulation with a view to
defending a genuine, simulation theory—i.e. a simulation theory not committed to
metarepresentational competence - can hardly ground even some ordinary aspects of
naı¨ve psychological competence, let apart the richness of full-blown human
mindreading. Thus, if one wants to mobilise a notion of simulation to account for
mindreading, it must be a notion which involves pretence; hence, if we are right, a—
definitely weak, or minimal—form of metarepresentation.23
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